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We explain why means-tested college tuition and means-tested government grants to college 
students can be efficient. The critical idea is that attending college is both an investment good 
and a consumption good. If education has a consumption benefit and tuition is uniform, the 
marginal rich student is less smart than some poor people who choose not to attend college, 
thus reducing the social returns to education and increasing the college’s cost of education. 
We find that competition among profit-maximizing colleges results in means-tested tuition. In 
addition, to maximize the social returns to education government should means-test grants. 
We thus provide a rationale for means-tested tuition and grants which relies neither on capital 
market imperfections nor on redistributive objectives. 
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College tuition and government grants to students are commonly means-
tested.1 T h el i t e r a t u r eo ﬀers three main arguments for this: capital market
imperfections, redistribution, and price discrimination by monopolistic col-
leges. Although all these arguments are appealing, none is fully satisfactory.
First, means-tested tuition fees or grants are ineﬃcient ways of correcting
capital constraints. Providing students with loans (with repayment condi-
tional on future income) is the eﬃcient and more equitable way of deal-
ing with missing capital or insurance markets (Jacobs and Van Wijnbergen
(2005)). Second, though optimal redistribution may require means-tested
grants (Dur, Teulings, and Van Rens (2004)), the redistribution argument
cannot explain why private colleges in a competitive education market charge
diﬀerent tuition to students with diﬀerent incomes. Third, it is unlikely that
exploitation of monopolistic power by colleges can fully explain why tuition
varies with income. As Epple, Romano, and Sieg (2004, p. 5) note, “The
stylized fact that colleges can extract so much revenue from higher income
households is clearly an empirical puzzle given many colleges competing for
students. ... More future research is needed to ﬁnd other compelling expla-
nations for this puzzle.”
We provide a new rationale for why both college tuition and govern-
ment grants to students are means-tested. The critical idea is that attending
college is both an investment which increases future earnings, and a con-
sumption good. One implication of the model is that a rich person of low
ability may be willing to pay more for college than would a poor person of
high ability. So colleges which want to attract smarter students may charge
poor students a lower price than rich students. Moreover, when the social
return to education exceeds the private return, allocative eﬃciency requires
government grants to students to be means-tested.
The idea that education is not merely an investment but also provides
consumption beneﬁts is widely acknowledged. Some empirical evidence shows
a consumption value of higher education. Lazear (1977), using data on
young males in the United States, ﬁnds that individuals with much education
(M.A.’s and Ph.D’s), push education beyond the level that maximizes the
present value of future income, suggesting that education has consumption
1See the review of tuition policy and student support in 13 countries by the Irish
Department of Education and Science (2003). See National Center for Education Statistics
(2003) for details about tuition and ﬁnancial aid to students in the United States.
2value. The reverse holds for lower levels of education. Heckman, Lochner,
and Taber (1999), using data on male earnings in the United States, ﬁnd
that individuals in the second highest ability quartile enjoy large nonpecu-
niary beneﬁts from attending college; individuals in the two lowest and in the
highest ability quartiles suﬀer nonpecuniary costs.2 Using a larger dataset,
Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman (2003) estimate that, when ignoring psychic
gains, 40% of the persons going to college would regret attending college.
Once they account for psychic beneﬁts and costs of attending college, only
8% of college graduates regret attending college. They conclude, therefore,
that much of the gain from college is nonpecuniary.3 Using Dutch data,
Oosterbeek and van Ophem (2000) ﬁnd evidence that schooling is a good
that raises future income and generates utility. Alstadsæter (2004) provides
similar evidence for Norway.
2L i t e r a t u r e
Since Schultz (1960) and Becker (1964) developed the theory of human cap-
ital, economists have neglected the consumption beneﬁts from education.
Exceptions are Alstadsæter (2003) and Malchow-Møller and Skaksen (2004),
who study optimal taxation and ﬁnancing of education when education yields
both a pecuniary and a non-pecuniary return. Both papers employ a repre-
sentative agent framework and so abstract from heterogeneity in ability and
in wealth among agents, which are crucial in our model. Bovenberg and Ja-
cobs (2003) allow for consumption beneﬁts from education in a model where
2Judd (2000) argues that when students of high-ability expect their ﬁnancial returns
to college to equal the average returns to college, the ﬁnding of nonpecuniary cost for the
highest ability quartile may arise from the correlation between expectational errors and
ability. Also note that the second-highest ability quartile (that is, the group which enjoys
a nonpecuniary beneﬁt from college education) is particularly relevant for our argument
as it contains many marginal college students.
3Likewise, they ﬁnd that many of the persons who choose not to go to college would
incur a nonpecuniary cost when going to college. These costs (e.g, the pain of studying)
likely arise not from college attendance per se, but instead increase with the eﬀort a student
devotes to studying. If increased studying increases future income, and if the marginal
utility from income declines with its level, then eﬀort will be higher the lower a student’s
initial income. This could make it increasingly attractive for a college to attract poorer
students. Our model can thus be extended to allow for both consumption beneﬁts and
psychic costs of college attendance, with qualitative results similar to those we report
below.
3agents have heterogeneous ability, but no wealth.
Our paper relates to Wickelgren (2001). He argues that given past dis-
crimination, non-discriminatory employers or universities may voluntarily
practice aﬃrmative action in their hiring or admission decisions–a person
who overcame discrimination is likely more able than someone in the same
position who faced no such obstacle. Likewise, in our paper, colleges charge
lower tuition to poor students, who have higher expected ability than the rich
students they displace. This stems, however, from the consumption beneﬁt
from education rather than from past discrimination.
De Fraja (2005) argues that high-potential individuals from groups with
relatively few high-potential individuals (‘disadvantaged’ groups) should re-
ceive higher government grants, since grants to such people entail lower bud-
getary cost (lower inframarginal subsidies). As we shall see, such a result
also appears in our model. We identify two other reasons (of which one also
holds even when the government budget constraint does not bind) for why
government should give larger grants to poorer people.
3 Assumptions
College students diﬀer in two ways. First, students diﬀer in ability, denoted
by a. Second, at the start of their college career, students diﬀer in wealth,
w. Each person knows his own ability, but the colleges and the government
do not; the colleges and government can only observe a student’s wealth.4
We assume that students’ ability and wealth are distributed according to
the joint density function f(a,w). In Sections 4 and 5, we assume that the
ability distribution is independent of wealth, that is, f(a,w)=f(a) for all
w. Section 6 discusses the implications of relaxing this assumption.
For simplicity, we consider a two-period model. In period 1 a person can
choose whether to attend college. In period 2, a person who did not attend
college has income a. A person who attended college earns a + p(a),w h e r e
4This assumption simpliﬁes the analysis, but is more restrictive than we need. We
could allow a college to observe an imperfect signal of ability (e.g., high school grades or
scores on standardized tests), as in Fernandez and Gali (1999). The consumption beneﬁts
of education would still mean, however, that for a given signal, a rich student with a given
ability would be more willing to pay for college than would a poor student with the same
ability.
4p0(a) > 0: the return to college increases with ability.5 We also assume that
p00(a)=0 . As we shall see, this assumption ensures that we can safely ignore
opportunities to work in period 1 by people who do not attend college.
For simplicity, suppose consumption of goods occurs only in period 2;
since we assume perfect capital markets, that simpliﬁcation does not aﬀect
our results. Consumption in period 2 by a person with initial wealth w who
did not attend college is a+w. Let college tuition to a person with wealth w
be t(w). It follows that consumption by a person with initial wealth w who
attended college is a + p(a)+w − t(w).
T h eu t i l i t yf r o mc o n s u m i n gg o o d si sg i v e nb yt h ef u n c t i o nv(·),w i t ht h e
usual properties: v0(·) > 0, v00(·) < 0,a n dv000(·) ≥ 0. The consumption
beneﬁt from attending college is b.T h i sb e n e ﬁtc a nr e ﬂect the opportunities
to date members of the opposite sex, to enjoy the sports facilities, to take
part in the excitement of school football games, to live away from home, and
so on. For convenience, we assume that utility is separable in consumption
g o o d sa n dt h ec o n s u m p t i o nb e n e ﬁto fe d u c a t i o n . 6
The topic we address becomes interesting if a college prefers to enroll
smart students. This can arise for many reasons. 1) Peer group eﬀects
within colleges can make increased attendance by smart students beneﬁta l l
other students (see Rothschild and White (1995) and Epple and Romano
(1998)). 2) Faculty may ﬁnd it more pleasant or interesting to teach smart
students, and so a college may attract better faculty, or attract a given quality
of faculty at lower cost, the better are its students.7 3) Studious students
may be less likely to engage in behavior (such as drunkenness) which may
impose costly legal liability on the college. 4) Attracting smarter students
may enhance a college’s prestige and increase future alumni donations.
We ﬁnd that a simple but fruitful approach is to suppose that a college’s
costs decline with the quality of its students. Let a college’s cost of educating
5Most empirical studies ﬁnd complementarity between ability and education, see Har-
mon, Oosterbeek and Walker (2003) and Dur and Teulings (2004).
6Note that allowing b to depend on ability a does not aﬀect our results qualitatively.
Allowing b to depend on w strengthens the results when b0(w) is positive, but may reverse
the results when b0(w) is negative.
7At Yale University, the “faculty was astonished and delighted by the leap
in academic ability" of freshmen after it changed undergraduate admission poli-
cies in the 1960’s. See “The birth of a new institution: How two Yale pres-
idents and their admissions directors tore up the ‘old blueprint’ to create a
modern Yale" by Geoﬀrey Kabaservice, Yale Alumni Magazine, December 1999,
(http://www.yalealumnimagazine.com/issues/99_12/admissions.html)
5a student with ability a be c(a),w i t hc0(a) < 0. Throughout, we assume
perfect competition in the market for college education.
4 Market equilibrium
A student with ability a and wealth w attends college if
v[a + p(a) − t(w)+w]+b ≥ v(a + w). (1)
Let a∗(w) denote the ability of a student with wealth w,w h o ,i ne q u i l i b -
rium, is indiﬀerent about attending college. In a competitive equilibrium,
the following two conditions hold for all w:
v{a
∗(w)+p[a










The ﬁrst equation describes, for each level of wealth the students who
attend college. Since smarter students have a higher return to education,
p0(a) > 0, a person with wealth w and with ability a ≥ a∗(w) attends col-
lege.8 The second equation describes the equilibrium level of tuition. Perfect
competition implies that tuition for a student with wealth w equals the ex-
pected cost of educating a student with wealth w.
If education has no consumption value (b =0 ), equation (2) reduces to
p[a
∗(w)] = t(w). (4)
Therefore, a person will attend college only if the return to education is
higher than or equal to tuition. Using (3), we can verify that when b =0 ,
equilibrium tuition is independent of wealth, t0(w)=0 . For suppose wealthier
8If people who do not attend college work in period 1, equation (2) becomes
v {a∗(w)+p[a∗(w)] − t(w)+w} + b = v[2a∗(w)+w].
If p is a linear function of a, none of our results are aﬀected. When, however, p(a)
is concave, the highest ability students may prefer working in period 1 over attending
college, because their opportunity cost of education may exceed their return to education.
We abstract from this.
6students were charged higher tuition, t0(w) > 0. T h e ne q u a t i o n( 4 )w o u l d
imply that a∗ increases with wealth w. Given that the distribution of ability
is independent of wealth, this means that richer students would on average be
smarter. As c0(a) < 0, the right-hand side of equation (3) then implies that
a college’s expected average cost is lower when admitting richer students. So
when t0(w) > 0, the expected cost per student declines with the wealth of the
student body, whereas tuition increases with student’s wealth. Clearly, when
t0(w) > 0, the zero-proﬁtc o n d i t i o n( 3 )i sv i o l a t e df o rs o m ew. A similar
argument applies for t0(w) < 0, and for any other nonuniform tuition policy.
Only when tuition is uniform, t0(w)=0 , can the zero-proﬁtc o n d i t i o nh o l d
for all levels of wealth. With uniform tuition, the average ability of students,
and so the expected cost per-student, will be independent of the wealth of
students. So if attending college has no consumption value, tuition will be
uniform.
When b>0, condition (2) implies that some students with p(a) <t (w)
attend college. Though this reduces their lifetime consumption of goods,
they enjoy the consumption beneﬁt, b,o fc o l l e g e .
Proposition 1: If college education has consumption beneﬁts
(b>0), colleges charge higher tuition to richer students (t0(w) > 0).
Proof: See Appendix.
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is straightforward. By the concavity
of v(·), the marginal utility of consuming goods declines with wealth, so that
a rich person is more willing than is a poor person to reduce consumption
of goods in return for the consumption beneﬁts from education. With uni-
form tuition, the least able poor student in college will therefore be smarter
than the least able rich student. This also implies that poor students will
on average be smarter than rich students. As a college’s cost of education
declines with student’s ability, in the competitive equilibrium colleges charge
lower tuition to poorer students. In equilibrium, the rich will nevertheless
be over-represented in college. For proportional representation would imply
equal expected ability and, so, in a competitive equilibrium, uniform tuition.
In equilibrium, some persons who avoid college are smarter than some
who attend college. Since the smarter persons get a higher return from
education, aggregate output would be higher if they attended college. When,
however, externalities are absent, the equilibrium is Pareto-eﬃcient. Forcing
7a poorer but smarter person to replace a richer but dumber student at the
same tuition rate would reduce the utility of both students. Though the
smarter person would enjoy a higher rate of return and would enjoy the
same consumption beneﬁt from education, the tuition payment reduces the
utility from consumption goods of the poor student more than it reduces the
utility of the rich student.
Our examination of means-tested college tuition contrasts with the idea
that colleges aim to attract poor and minority students to promote diversity
or equity. Diﬀerentiation of tuition by colleges for these reasons could make
the average poor student in college less able than the average rich student,
and some current evidence shows that diﬀerence (e.g. Rothstein (2004)). But
other evidence shows, as our model predicts, that poor students enrolled in
college are of higher average ability than rich students, and that means-tested
ﬁnancial aid can increase the quality of the student body. At a National
Press Club event centered around the book America’s Untapped Resource:
Low-Income Students in Higher Education, a former College Board oﬃcial
claimed that “The fact is, the dumbest rich kids have as good a chance
of going to college as the smartest poor kids.”9 Consistent with this view, a
study by the Maryland Higher Education Commission found that community
college students who receive need-based ﬁnancial aid perform as well as or
better than their wealthier peers. For example, 74.3 percent of the low-
income students who received ﬁnancial aid returned for a second year of study
at their community college, transferred, or earned a credential, compared
to 62.5 percent of non-recipients. Similarly, 40.5 percent of new full-time
freshman who received need-based ﬁnancial aid transferred to a public four-
year institution and/or earned a community college degree within ﬁve years
of matriculation, as opposed to about one-third of non-recipients. Similar
results hold for Texas.10
The history of means-tested ﬁnancial aid at Yale University oﬀers another
instructive example.11 In the Class of 1957, before Yale oﬀered means-tested
9See National Association of Student Financial Aid Administrators, news release Jan-
uary 15, 2004, at www.NASFAA.org.
10For Maryland, see Janis Battaglini, “A comparison of the retention, trans-
fer and graduation rates of need-based ﬁnancial aid recipients at Maryland pub-
lic colleges and universities with the performance of non-recipients," February
2004. (http://www.mhec.state.md.us/higherEd/about/Meetings/EdPolicyMeetings/03-
10-04/). For Texas, see “Messing with success.” Houston Chronicle, March 12, 2005,
p. B12.
11The following is drawn from “The birth of a new institution: How two Yale
8ﬁnancial aid and before it practiced needs-blind admissions, graduates of
private schools (who were overwhelmingly wealthy) constituted more than
60 percent of the Class of 1957. But they constituted less than half the
membership of Phi Beta Kappa (the most prestigious national honor society)
and one-sixth of the membership of Tau Beta Pi, the national engineering
honor society. The largest feeder schools (Andover, Exeter, Lawrenceville,
Hotchkiss, and St. Paul’s, all of which are private), sent about 20 percent
of the class; but each accounted for only one of the 64 members of Phi
Beta Kappa. Other traditional feeder schools such as Groton, Hill, Kent, St.
Mark’s, St. George’s, and Taft contributed no members to Phi Beta Kappa.
In 1963 Yale greatly increased its ﬁnancial aid, and by 1966 adopted a
fully needs-blind admissions policy: the University no longer rejected quali-
ﬁed applicants who could not aﬀord Yale’s costs, eliminated any quota on the
number of scholarship students, and placed no limit on the amount of money
available for grants and loans. The class entering in 1966 was composed of
58 percent public school students, a higher percentage than ever before, and
a jump from 52 percent the previous year; ﬁnancial aid jumped to nearly $1
million, 30 percent above what it had been the year before; gift aid from the
University increased by almost 50 percent. This class entered with higher
SAT scores than ever before; a student who scored its mean SAT verbal mark
of 697 would have been at the 75th percentile of the class that entered four
years before.
5 Government means-tested grants
So far, we ignored externalities from education. Suppose now that, in addi-
tion to the private return p(a), there is a public return to education λp(a).
Of course, only the private beneﬁts, not the social returns, aﬀect a person’s
decision to attend college, or a college’s tuition policy. The resulting underin-
vestment in human capital can be removed by subsidies. We shall see in this
section that the consumption beneﬁt from education implies that optimal
subsidies will be means-tested rather than uniform.
One reason the social return to education may exceed the private return is
taxation. If each student ignores how his education can increase government’s
presidents and their admissions directors tore up the ‘old blueprint’ to create a
modern Yale,"by Geoﬀrey Kabaservice, Yale Alumnni Magazine, December 1999.
(http://www.yalealumnimagazine.com/issues/99_12/admissions.html)
9income tax revenues, and if the cost of education is not fully deductible
at the same rate as the returns to education are taxed, taxation results
in underinvestment in education (see, among others, Boadway, Marceau,
and Marchand (1996), Anderson and Konrad (2003), and Bovenberg and
Jacobs (2003)). Education can also generate externalities in production.
For instance, if innovation increases with the knowledge workers gained in
college, and innovations are aﬀorded imperfect patent protection, then the
private return to education is less than the social return. Such externalities
feature prominently in models of endogenous economic growth (Lucas (1988),
Romer (1986), 1990)). Recent empirical evidence is provided by among others
Moretti (2004) and Teulings and Van Rens (2003), and surveyed in Sianesi
and Van Reenen (2003).
Consider a government that aims to maximize national output net of the







L e tg o v e r n m e n ta ﬀect behavior by providing grants, g(w),t os t u d e n t s ,w h i c h




∗(w)] + g(w) − t(w)+w} + b = v[a
∗(w)+w]. (6)
Tuition is still given by (3). For simplicity, we assume that the government
has a given budget, denoted by G, for student grants:
ZZ
a∗(w)
f(a,w)g(w)dadw ≤ G. (7)
We will consider both a binding and a non-binding budget constraint.
Consider ﬁrst education which has no consumption beneﬁt( b =0 ). Then,
as we saw in the previous section, in equilibrium all people whose return to
education exceeds the tuition attend college. Moreover, tuition is indepen-
dent of a student’s wealth and equals the expected cost of education. Hence,
12Alternatively, we could assume that the government maximizes social welfare. How-
ever, since utility is concave in consumption goods, our eﬃciency argument would be
intertwined with redistributive concerns.
10if externalities are absent (λ =0 ), optimal student grants are zero (g(w)=0
for all w): grants would induce people whose return to education is lower
t h a nt h ee x p e c t e dc o s t so fc o l l e g ee d u c a t i o nt oa t t e n dc o l l e g e . W h e nt h e
social returns to education exceed the private returns (λ>0), optimal stu-
dent grants are positive, so that students internalize the externality of their
education on national output. Optimal student grants are independent of
student’s wealth. If grants varied with student’s wealth, students receiv-
ing high grants would on average be less smart than students receiving low
grants. This would result in lower output (since p0(a) > 0) and higher cost
of college education (since c0(a) < 0) than when the government spends the
same budget on uniform grants.
Consider next education which has consumption beneﬁts (b>0).
Proposition 2: If college education has consumption beneﬁts
(b>0), and the government budget constraint does not bind, op-
timal student grants are means-tested (g0(w) < 0).
Proof: See Appendix.
The intuition behind Proposition 2 follows. The consumption beneﬁt
from education implies that with uniform grants (or without grants) some
poor people not attending college are smarter than the least able rich student.
Since the return to education increases with a student’s ability, a grant to
a poor student has higher social beneﬁts than a grant to a rich student–it
induces smarter students to attend college. When the government’s budget
constraint is not binding (the shadow cost of public funds is zero), the grant
policy must induce the social return to education to equal the marginal cost
of education for the marginal student at any given level of wealth:
(1 + λ)p[a
∗(w)] − c[a
∗(w)] = 0, (8)
implying that college education is independent of student’s wealth. The
tuition charged by proﬁt-maximizing colleges will therefore be independent
of wealth. But to induce the poor to attend college, government must provide
larger grants to poorer students. We can see from equation (6) that (8)
requires poorer students be given higher grants. Note that this also holds
when λ =0 , that is, in the absence of externalities. Then, the government
optimally taxes college education for the rich and subsidizes college education
for the poor, so as to increase national output.
11Proposition 3: If college education has consumption beneﬁts
(b>0), and the government budget constraint binds, a suﬃcient





weakly increases with wealth w.
Proof: See Appendix.
When the government budget constraint binds (the shadow cost of pub-
lic funds is positive), achieving full equality of education by means-tested
government grants is not optimal. Poor students attending college will be
smarter than rich students attending college, and so proﬁt-maximizing col-
leges will make tuition increase in student’s wealth. For three reasons op-
timal government grants decrease with student’s wealth. First, as with a
non-binding budget constraint, in the absence of a grant some poor people
who do not attend college are smarter than some rich students, so that the
social return to increasing education of the poor is larger. Second, because
the marginal utility of income declines with income, the poor respond more
than the rich to an increase in government grants. Hence, a given increase
in college participation is attained at lower cost.13 Third, an increase in the
grant to rich students involves a higher budgetary cost than a similar increase




f(a,w)dadw increases with w). Clearly, this should be com-
pared with the number of students at the margin, f [a∗(w),w],w h or e s p o n d
to an increase in the grant. When the condition in Proposition 3 holds, con-
centrating grant provision on poor students reduces the government’s cost, as
relatively fewer grants are provided to students who would choose to attend
college anyhow.14
13Some evidence shows that the price elasticity of demand for higher education declines
with income; e.g. McPherson and Schapiro (1991) and Kane (1994). However, Cameron
and Heckman (1999), Dynarski (2000), and Stanley (2003) ﬁnd no or the reverse eﬀect.
14This third reason has also been identiﬁed by De Fraja (2005) as an eﬃciency rationale
for reverse discrimination in education.
126 Generalization: Ability correlated with wealth
We assumed that the distribution of students’ ability is independent of wealth.
Clearly, relaxing this assumption may aﬀect our results.
Consider ﬁrst our result on a college’s tuition policy. We saw that when
education is enjoyable poor students are on average smarter than rich stu-
dents, and so proﬁt-maximizing colleges make tuition increase with student’s
wealth. When the ability distribution depends on wealth, this need not hold.
Though the marginal rich student will have lower ability than some poor stu-
dents, the rich may on average be smarter than poor students, for instance
when students’ ability and wealth are strongly positively correlated. Then,
in the competitive equilibrium tuition may decline with wealth. Only when
the consumption beneﬁt from education is suﬃciently large, will average abil-
ity decline with student’s wealth, and so will tuition increase with student’s
wealth.
Next consider our result on means-tested government grants. When the
government budget constraint does not bind, allowing for more general dis-
tribution functions does not aﬀect our result. This is seen by inspecting (6)
and (8). Equation (8) implies that optimality requires a∗ to be indepen-
dent of wealth, independent of how ability and wealth are distributed over
the population. Equation (6) then implies that grants should decrease with
wealth.
Our result on government grants may diﬀer when the government budget
constraint binds. First, the eﬀect of an increase in grants to persons with
a given wealth depends on the density of students at the margin for that
wealth, f[a∗(w),w]. (See the ﬁrst term in ﬁrst-order condition (13) in the
Appendix.) Second, the rich need not necessarily outnumber the poor in
college, and so the cost of inframarginal subsidies may be higher for poorer
groups. (See the second term in ﬁrst-order condition (13) in the Appendix.)
Thus, the trade-oﬀ between increasing the social beneﬁts from education and
the budgetary cost of grant provision may be aﬀected. Since, at the margin,
poorer students are still smarter than richer students, our main argument,
that grants to poorer students have higher social beneﬁts than grants to
richer students, still holds. This is the more so, the higher is the consumption
beneﬁt from education. So when the consumption beneﬁtf r o me d u c a t i o ni s
suﬃciently large, grants will still decrease with student’s wealth.
137C o n c l u s i o n
We showed that the consumption beneﬁt from attending college makes rich
students, who are most willing to pay for the consumption beneﬁt, especially
eager to attend college. Among the poor, only the brightest attend college.
Hence, when colleges prefer to enroll smart students, the market equilibrium
will have tuition be means-tested. Rich students are nevertheless overrepre-
sented in college, and the marginal rich student has lower ability than the
marginal poor student. To maximize the social returns to education, gov-
ernment should therefore means-test grants. The consumption beneﬁtf r o m
education can thus provide a rationale for why both college tuition and gov-
ernment grants to students are means-tested.
The general eﬀect we identiﬁed can apply in areas outside of college.
Consider the eﬀects of the move of the German capital from Bonn to Berlin.
Bonn was an unattractive location, while Berlin is a highly attractive city
in which to work and live. Therefore, governmental oﬃces in Bonn may
have attracted oﬃcials dedicated to public policy; oﬃces in Berlin would
also attract people who want a government job not because they like the
job, but for the opportunity to work in Berlin. Or think of a professional
conference. If the intent is to attract people interested in the contents of the
conference, then the organizers may want to hold it in a location which is
unattractive for a vacation.
148 Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 :
Let (1) hold with equality and replace a with a∗.T o t a l l yd i ﬀerentiating




[1 − t0(w)]v0 [a∗ + p(a∗) − t(w)+w] − v0(a∗ + w)
[1 + p0(a∗)]v0 [a∗ + p(a∗) − t(w)+w] − v0(a∗ + w)
. (9)





Hence, since p0(a∗) > 0 and v00(·) < 0, the denominator of (9) is always
positive. The sign of the numerator depends on the value of t0(w).
Suppose that t0(w) ≤ 0. Then (9) implies that da∗/dw < 0,a n ds o ,s i n c e
f(a,w)=f(a), the right-hand side of (3) increases with w.S i n c et0(w) ≤ 0
implies that the left-hand side of (3) weakly decreases with w, the zero-proﬁt
condition (3) will be violated for some w.
If t0(w) > 0, da∗/dw may be positive, namely when t0(w) is very large, see
(9). This implies that the right-hand side of equation (3) decreases with w.
Since t0(w) > 0 implies that the left-hand side of (3) increases with w,t h i s
cannot hold in a competitive equilibrium. Only if t0(w) > 0 for all w, but not
too large so that da∗/dw < 0 for all w, will both the left-hand side and the
right-hand side of (3) increase with w.N o t et h a tt0(w) < 1,b e c a u s et0(w) ≥ 1
would imply da∗/dw > 0.N o t ea l s ot h a t0 <t 0(w) < 1 and p0(a∗) > 0 imply
that −1 <d a ∗/dw < 0.
Proof of Proposition 2:
The government maximizes (5) with respect to g(w) and subject to (3)












v0 {a∗(w)+p[a∗(w)] + g(w) − t(w)+w}
{1+p0 [a∗(w)]}v0 {a∗(w)+p[a∗(w)] + g(w) − t(w)+w} − v0 [a∗(w)+w]
< 0,
(11)
15which follows from (6). Since both da∗(w)/dg(w) and f [a∗(w),w] are nonzero,
the ﬁrst-order condition (10) reduces to:
(1 + λ)p[a
∗(w)] − c[a
∗(w)] = 0. (12)
That is, the optimal grant scheme g(w) is such that for the marginal student
from each wealth group, the social return to education equals the marginal
cost of education. Clearly, this implies that in the optimum a∗(w) is inde-
pendent of student’s wealth. Tuition t(w) will therefore also be independent
of student’s wealth, see (3). Totally diﬀerentiating (6) with respect to w and




v0 {a∗(w)+p[a∗(w)] + g(w) − t(w)+w} − v0 [a∗(w)+w]
v0 {a∗(w)+p[a∗(w)] + g(w) − t(w)+w}
< 0.
Hence, ﬁrst-order condition (12) can only be satisﬁed when grants decrease
with student’s wealth, g0(w) < 0.
Proof of Proposition 3:
The government maximizes (5) with respect to g(w) and subject to (3),












where Λ is the Lagrange-multiplier for the budget constraint, and da∗(w)/dg(w)
is given by (11). The ﬁr s tp a r to fﬁrst-order condition (13) describes the
beneﬁts of increasing grants to students with wealth w. Starting from any
uniform grant scheme, g0(w)=0 ,t h em a r g i n a lb e n e ﬁts of grant provision
decrease with student’s wealth w since:
1) The term in curly brackets is larger for smaller w since a∗(w) decreases
with w,a n dp0(a) > 0 and c0(a) < 0.
2) The term −da∗(w)/dg(w) is larger for smaller w by the concavity of









16Since p00(a)=0 , we only need to know how the last term in the denominator
changes when w changes. Straightforward algebra shows that since v00(·) < 0
and v000(·) ≥ 0, the last term in the denominator increases in w. Hence,
da∗(w)/dg(w) increases in w (is closer to zero, the higher is w).
The term f [a∗(w),w] in (13) may decrease or increase with w,d e p e n d i n g
on the properties of the distribution function. The marginal beneﬁts of grant
provision decrease with w if f [a∗(w),w] decreases with w. The second part
of (13) describes the budgetary costs of increasing grants to students with
wealth w. Starting from any uniform grant scheme, g0(w)=0 ,t h em a r g i n a l
cost of grant provision increase with student’s wealth w since a∗(w) decreases
with w. After dividing the ﬁrst-order condition (13) by f [a∗(w),w],t h eﬁrst
part of (13) always decreases with w, whereas the second part decreases with
w if the condition in Proposition 3 holds. Hence, the condition in Proposition
3i sas u ﬃcient condition for optimality of means-testing government grants.
179N o t a t i o n
a Ability
b Consumption beneﬁt of college education
c(a) College’s cost of educating a student with ability a
f(a,w) Density of the population as a function of ability a and wealth w
g(w) government-provided grant to a student with wealth w
p(a) Return to education of college graduate with ability a
t(w) Tuition at college for a student with wealth w
v(·) Utility from income
w Wealth
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